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SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CCC 1988 
(Part III) 
The Industrial Revolution and Crime in Germany: 
Quantitative and Qualitative Observations 
Eric A. Johnson * 
This paper reports on findings from years of research into the effects of 
socioeconomic change on the incidence of criminal activity in Germany 
between 1848 and 1914. It discusses the results of numerous analyses of 
time-series and cross-sectional data and a thorough investigation of literary 
and qualitative data pertaining to crime and justice in Bismarckian and 
Wilhelmian Germany. Although the quantitative and qualitative data do 
not always neatly overlap one another, they both point to the same general 
conclusions - namely that the supposed ill effects of urbanization and in-
dustrialization had very limited impact on patterns of criminality. What 
appeared to have a much stronger bearing on the incidence of criminality 
was economic hardship, ethnic strife, discrimination, and political action. 
These findings call into question many long-standing and commonly 
accepted theoretical statements about the causes of criminality in all so-
cieties, but they need to be replicated in other national contexts if they are 
to be generally accepted. If they cannot be replicated, it will appear that 
Germany may have again followed a Sonderweg (different developmental 
path). But this author finds that doubtful. Though Germany's political 
structures and ethnic minorities were clearly different from other societies, 
recent quantitatively based studies of France, Germany, The United States, 
Sweden and elsewhere have reached many similar conclusions about the 
impact of the industrial revolution on criminality. (1) 
In Germany it is clear that no marked upsurge in criminality accom-
panied the economic and social changes and supposed dislocations asso-
ciated with the industrial revolution. Moreover, the size of communities, 
their rates of demographic and economic growth, and their predominant 
type of economic activity did not seriously affect criminal behavior. These 
* Address all communications to Eric A. Johnson, Dept. of History, Cen-
tral Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, Michigan 48859, USA. 
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findings refute the classic theories of Durkheim, Toennis, and Simmel and 
the warnings of various conservative political, religious, and civic leaders 
that urban and industrial life caused crime by means of anomie, aliena-
tion, crowding of population, and a break with church, family, and tradi-
tion. Once convincingly replicated elsewhere, such findings should have 
both theoretical and policy implications. Politicians and citizens should 
eventually realize that if cities and industrial areas have clean streets, good 
job opportunities, well housed and happy citizens, then they are likely not 
to have any more criminality than other types of communities. 
My investigation of literary sources such as German novels, plays, short 
stories, and newspaper accounts serves to support and provide flesh and 
blood to the faceless numbers. Though the popular genre of criminal li-
terature was less developed in Germany than in many countries, several 
important writers like Theodor Fontane, Gerhard Hauptmann, Wilhelm 
Raabe, and Karl May wrote about crime and justice in this period. (2) The 
analysis of their and others' works on criminality suggests that most Ger-
mans themselves did not believe that crime was associated with urbani-
zation or industrial change per se. Rather the literary record shows that 
crime in German popular culture was most often associated with poverty, 
foreigners, and ethnic minorities (usually Poles or Lithuanians). The ana-
lysis of several leading newspapers in this period shows also that though 
crime was not usually portrayed in a prurient or even detailed fashion, 
most newspaper writers attributed criminality to the actions of their poli-
tical enemies and to human weakness as opposed to urban and industrial 
change. (3) 
The Quantitative Evidence 
To provide support for my assertions above I will first summarize and 
describe some of my quantitative investigations and then make some com-
ments on my qualitative work. To assess quantitatively the impact of urban 
and industrial change on criminal behavior I have thought it necessary 
both to analyze long-term trends of national and sub-national crimes fi-
gures and to analyze cross-sectional data cutting across the entire society 
(or as much of the society as possible) at different points in time. It is of 
course of paramount importance to have a clear understanding of what 
kinds of data are being used (i.e. whether the crime figures represent con-
viction records, arrests, police reports, etc.), and it is always necessary to 
have a healthy scepticism about the accuracy of whatever data are em-
ployed. Though it is widely recognized that the so-called »dark-figure« in 
criminal data makes all findings tentative and suspect and many have 
argued that criminal data shows nothing more than the actions of criminal 
justice officials rather than the actual amount of criminal wrongdoing, it is 
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my belief that all social data, not just criminal justice data, have »dark 
figures« which must be taken into account. But taking all of this into 
account, I believe that the German criminal justice data is perhaps exem-
plary in comparison with comparable data in other societies. (4) So, if the 
data are treated cautiously, and if a variety of different measures of »crime« 
are employed and analyzed with various and appropriate techniques, and 
if the results consistently point toward the same conclusions, then it is 
possible to make some assertions with at least some measure of validity. 
Furthermore, the validity of the quantitative results is strengthened if se-
rious analysis of appropriate qualitative data point toward the same con-
clusions as well. 
As early as the late nineteenth century, several German sociologists and 
criminologists such as Georg von Mayr, Wilhelm Starke, and Gustav 
Aschaffenburg made serious headway in analyzing primarily time-series 
and tabular data. (5) More recently their findings have been reexamined, 
added to, and treated with modern statistical techniques by several histo-
rians including German scholars like Dirk Blasius, and American scholars 
like Howard Zehr and myself. (6) Piecing together the results of all these 
works, it is possible to state with considerable assurance that the rates of 
most major types of criminal behavior such as theft, assault and battery, 
and homicide did not change much over the whole of the nineteenth 
century and well into the twentieth century. To be sure, there were some 
important fluctuations of short-term duration, especially in that everyone 
agrees that property offenses rose considerably during periods of marked 
economic hardship like the 1840s, but most agree that neither most types 
of either property or personal crime became measurably more frequent or 
infrequent over the entire time period. This means that the rates of these 
offenses were roughly the same before, during, and after the time of Ger-
many's greatest industrial advances (usually considered to be sometime 
between 1848 and 1914). Thus the ever more urbanized and industrialized 
German society did not have more criminality. (7) The only significant 
changes in criminal behavior in fact were results of the decriminalization 
of some behaviors like wood theft, which prior to the middle of the centu-
ry had been the most frequent of all offenses, (8) and to the creation of 
various new laws, mainly of a sociopolitical nature, in the late Imperial 
period. (9) Actually, the only serious divergence of opinion amongst scho-
lars of long-term German crime trends is between Howard Zehr and my-
self over the issue of whether or not there was an upsurge in most forms of 
violent criminality at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Zehr argues that there was for assault and battery, but 
that there was not for more serious offenses such as murder and mans-
laughter. I have argued that the reason for the apparent decline in homi-
cide was due to more lenient sentencing practices which are easily docu-
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mented. (10) Had Zehr used measures other than mere conviction rates, 
such as the corners' records which I have used, then he would have found 
that there was indeed a considerable increase in homicide. But this increa-
se was only temporary as homicide rates and other crime rates returned to 
pattern once relative normally was reestablished, if only briefly, during the 
mid 1920s. Despite the ebbs and flows of the time-series rates, it is clear 
that urbanization, city living, industrialization, or anomie did not occasion 
any marked or sustained increase in crime rates when viewed over a long-
term perspective. 
Although time-series analysis does provide some assurance that the in-
dustrial revolution did not occasion higher levels of crime and violence, 
cross-sectional analyses are needed at different points in time to add more 
assurance to this argument, to test a variety of hypotheses about the impact 
of urbanization and industrialization on criminal behavior, and to des-
cribe the changes in criminal patterns that occurred during Germany's 
industrial revolution. In my first published papers on this subject, written 
in the mid and late 1970s, 1 attempted to do this by amassing a data set that 
was chock full of socioeconomic variables, though perhaps a bit limited in 
dependent variables (i.e. the crime variables) and taken from a level of 
analysis that was very highly aggregated (mainly the Regierungsbezirke of 
Prussia, which are similar to the departments of France used earlier in a 
similar study of French criminality by Charles Tilly and his associates). 
(11) This data set was then analyzed by several powerful, sophisticated, and 
somewhat mysterious statistical techniques such as factor, path, multiple 
regression, and multiple and partial correlation analysis. My results were 
interesting in that they demonstrated that there was no valid statistical 
associations between any measure of the level of urbanization or indu-
strialization or any rate of change in urban or industrial growth and any 
major type of criminal behavior (measured then only by court data). What 
did correlate with criminality of various types was measures of poverty and 
particularly measures of ethnicity and literacy. Furthermore, I found that, 
though there was considerable stability in the geographical patterns of 
criminality across Germany, there was a marked growth in crime rates in 
the Rhine-Ruhr region around the turn of the century and this growth 
seemed to run parallel with the Landflucht (migration) of many Germans 
seeking work from the northeastern, and primarily agricultural border 
districts of Prussia (now mostly in Poland and the Soviet Union) to the 
more industrialized and growing western regions. Though, since my com-
puter analyses showed no valid statistical relationship between any mea-
sure of crime and either the process, rate, or level or urban and industrial 
development, I concluded that anomie, Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, mo-
dernization, or any other theories linking the causation of crime to urban 
and industrial growth and change held no water and that crime in Imperial 
44 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 15 — 1990 — No. 1, 41-50
Germany at least was engendered primarily by poverty, geo-cultural tra-
ditions, and ethnic diversity. 
These findings and conclusions soon seemed extremely tentative to me 
for several reasons. One is that they did not explain very well why there 
was no correlation between urban and industrial growth and crime but 
there was the marked migration of crime from the rural northeast (though 
levels remained quite high there throughout the period) to the more de-
veloped west. I did try to explain this partially by suggesting that people 
may have transported their cultural patterns with them and that many of 
the people who moved westward were of poor and discriminated against 
ethnic groups like Poles and Lithuanians. A larger problem was that my 
cross-sectional data was of limited utility for a host reasons. Among them 
were that my dependent variables were lumped into broad categories such 
as »all crimes against the person« and »all crimes against property« which 
lacked any real specificity; (12) my statistical analysis was so sophisticated 
or rather that few historians could understand it and 1 was not certain 
eventually that I trusted it as well; and, most importantly, that my units of 
analysis were so few in number and so large that, though my analysis 
might have statistical validity, that validity might still have been rather 
spurious, if not to mathematically minded social scientists, to the more 
cautions historical profession. 
Hence I embarked on an ambitious project by which I laboriously amas-
sed a huge data set that consisted of cross-sectional data from over a thou-
sand different communities of Prussia and the rest of Germany (mainly 
Kreise). (13) This study included more specific measures of criminality 
such as simple and serious theft, murder, manslaughter, simple and aggra-
vated assault and battery, and other types of criminal behavior which are 
commonly accepted as measures of unlawful activity in all lands. Further-
more, when possible, I gathered measures of criminal activity from sources 
other than court records, such as in the case of using coroners' figures for 
homicide offenses, to add to the court records and provide a further test of 
their validity. The statistics I used were far simpler and more readily un-
derstandable to all scholars-mainly cross tabulations, percentages, and sim-
ple bivariate correlations. Some of my results were published in article 
form and others are to appear in a forthcoming book. (13) Though my 
findings generally supported my earlier investigations in that ethnicity and 
economic hardship proved to be even more highly related to criminal 
trends and that so measures of urban and industrial change correlated 
significantly with the crime variables, my view of crime causation was 
modified in one's significant way. That is that the causation of some pro-
perty offenses though never any personal offenses seemed at least to be 
partially explained by a kind of structural theory which links the urban 
environment but not the rate of urbanization to property crime. Though 
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this theory was argued by Charles Tilly in his study of French criminality 
and though I found it to be of some utility in my own limited work on 
France, (14) it has never been satisfactorily articulated and it rests on 
much speculation. Why cities on average have higher rates of theft than 
towns and villages is unknown. Tilly thinks it may be because of different 
types of police activity or because of a more materialistic urban ethos, but 
he has never been able to prove it. (15) And I must confess that it is still a 
mystery to me. Perhaps had I done a better job of controlling for possible 
intervening variables such as ethnicity, age, and literacy, then the theory 
may be shown to be totally spurious. But that awaits more work. 
There are many more results from my quantitative investigations of 
crime and the industrial revolution on which I could expand, but 1 believe 
that I have explained enough to detail the broad outlines of my mathe-
matically based observations and to demonstrate many of the pitfalls and 
limits of quantitative historical criminology. Clearly the quantitative evi-
dence is powerful, but it has its weaknesses just like all other types of 
evidence. Hence, historians and social scientists must continually make 
prudent judgement and always be mindful of the limitations of their data 
and the validity of their techniques no matter if they are working with 
quantitative or more traditional qualitative information. Also the more 
one knows about the ways in which data are generated, and the more one 
knows about the workings of the society which produces the social data 
used by he quantifier, the more one can trust one's findings and the more 
confidently one can posit one's conclusions. Clearly good quantitative hi-
story must be buttressed by solid qualitative evidence. (16) 
The Qualitative Evidence and Conclusions 
In work that I have yet to publish, I have made a serious investigation of 
the German criminal justice system during this period and in the popular 
and elite attitudes of German citizens in this period toward crime, crimi-
nals, and criminal justice. I have examined in detail the literary record left 
by novelists, playwrights, and short story writers; (17) I have read the 
comments by police officials, lawyers, judges, and other criminal justice 
officials; and I have read and analyzed crime news in numerous German 
newspapers. Not all of this evidence points sharply in the same direction, 
and it cannot be reduced down to mathematical equations. But certain 
commonalities are discernible, and generally the qualitative evidence sup-
ports my quantitative findings. Though crime was a subject of intense 
debate and many writers and newspaper editors used crime news to sup-
port their ideological predispositions, there was constant mention of the 
ways in which ethnic issues, foreignness, and economic matters prompted 
criminal misdeeds. Furthermore, there was nothing to suggest that urba-
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nization or industrialization caused crime except in the tirades of some 
conservative writers against their ideological enemies who often lived in 
cities - Jews, socialists, foreigners. 
Largely because this is after all the Cologne Computer Conference, I 
have given rather short shrift to my qualitative studies. Still I hope that I 
have said enough to underscore the absolute necessity of balancing quanti-
tative research with a firm grounding in qualitative evidence. Although 1 
strongly suspect that the impact of the industrial revolution on crime in 
Germany was not largely different from its impact on crime in other so-
cieties, only careful, laborious, and prudent scholarship by scholars whose 
feet are firmly implanted in both the quantitative and qualitative trenches 
of other nations can add much understanding to the issue of crime cau-
sation. Otherwise the Glasnost of quantitative research on criminal justice 
history will blow away like other hot air and the Perestroika needed for 
secure historical and theoretical knowledge will never be built. 
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